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the comdetermine
therefore annul the order.
concurred.
was denied
the
that the

A. No. 23225.

In Bank.

May 4,

CASUAI/rY COMPANY
Corporation),
v. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Corporation) et al., Defendants and Hespondents;
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S, LONDON (an UnAssoeia tion) et al., Interveners and ReMaster and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Right of
Recoupment.-\Vhere a judgment has been rendered against
employer for damages occasioned by the unauthorized negliact of his employe, the employer may recoup his loss
action against the negligent employe; as between emand employe in such a situation, the obligation of the
is primary and that of the employer secondary.
(Disapproving any contrary implie11tion~ in Co11solirluterl
pers v. Pacific E. Ins. Co., 45 Cnl.App.2d 288, 293, 114 P.2d
; Ai1· etc. Co. v. Employers' Liab. etc. Corp., 91 Cal.App.2d
132, 204 P.2d 647; Employe1·s etc. Co1·p. v. Pacific etc. Ins.
102 Cal.App.2d 188, 192, 227 P.2d 5:3; and Trodrrs etc.
Co. v. Pacific Emp. Ins. Co., 130 Cnl.App.2d 158, ] 65-166,
P.2Cl 4!B.)
See Cal.Jur., Master and Servant, § 68; Am.Jur., Master ana
§ 101.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Master and Servant, § 209; [2]
§ 233; [3] Insurance, § 301; [4, 12] Insurance, § 60;
§67; [6] Contracts, §140; [7] Insurance, §140;
~ 161; [9] Automobiles,§ 4; [10] Automobiles,§ 68;
~ 62; [13] Automobiles,§§ 68-1, 68-10; [14] Auto§ 68-1; [15] Appeal and Error, § 1230 (2) ; [16] Appeal
§ 1429.
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[2] Insurance--Subrogation.-Under equitable principles of subrothe insurer of an employer who has been compelled to
pay a judgment against the employer for damages occasioned
the unauthorized negligent act of his employe may recover
the negligent employe or the employe's insurer.
[3] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Construction of Contract.Construction of insurance policies and excess certificates is a
matter of law where they were introduced into evidence by
were not subject to conflicting inferences, and no
evidence was offered in aid of construction .
•{4a, 4b] !d.-Interpretation of Contract-Against Insurer.-Any
or uncertainty in an insurance policy must be
resolved against the insurer.
?(5] !d.-Interpretation of Contract-Endorsements.-If there is a
conflict in meaning between an endorsement and the body of an
insurance policy, the endorsement controls.
[6] Contracts-Interpretation-Written and Printed Matter.Under Civ. Code, § 1651, the written or specially prepared
portions of a contract control over those which are printed or
taken from a form.
/[7] Insurance - Interpretation of Contract- Endorsements. Where a highway construction company and a trucking company as joint venturers contracted with the state to do
highway construction work and typewritten endorsements
attached to a printed insurance policy issued to the highway
construction company added the trucking company as an
additional insured in connection with construction operations
conducted as a joint venture but provided that the policy
excluded coverage for all operations of the trucking company
other than construction operations conducted as a joint venture
and that the policy did not apply to automobiles owned, maintained or used by the trucking company even though used in a
joint venture operation, the policy provided no coverage to an
employe of the trucking company for an accident to a third
person which resulted from the employe's negligent operation
of a truck owned by the trucking company.
/[8] !d.-Risks-Right of Insurer to Select.-An insurance company has the right to limit the coverage of a policy issued by
it and, when it has done so, the plain language of the limitation
must be respected.
[9] Automobiles-Statutes-Construction.-The gt>ncral automobile financial responsibility law (Veh. Code, §§ 410-423.1) is
remedial in nature and in thf~ publie intPrcst is to be liberally
construed to the end of fostering its objectives.
See Cal.Jur.2d,
et seq.

In~nrance,

§ 1!12; Am.Jur., Insurance, § 166
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of Contract-With Reference to
pPnnissible, an insunwe:e contract
such construction as will fairly achieve its object
indemnity to the insured for the lossl·s to which
!d.-Interpretation of Contract-Against Insurer.-lf an muses language whieh is unc('rtain any reasonable doubt
be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to extent or
uf coverage, whether as to peril insured against, the
of liability, or the persun or persons proteeted, the
will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for
insured's benefit.
Automobiles-Insurance-Persons and Claims Covered.
Code, 416 (a part of the general automobile financial
law), declaring that a motor vehicle liability
"shall insure the person named therein and any other
or responsible for the use of said motor vehiele
with the . , , permission of said assured," coupled with
of the Highway Carriers Act (Stats. 1935, ch. 223)
language of a policy issued to a trucking company
the driver of a vehicle as to his duties on the
of an accident and declaring that the coverage
"shall comply with the provisions of the motor
financial responsibility law . . . which shall be appliwith respect to any such liability
out of the
. . . or nse of any automobile . . . to the extent
coverage and limits of liability required by such law,"
properly be construed to mean minimum coverage or
limits, but must be interpreted as providing full or
coverage in both aspects insofar as encompassed
law and not exceeding the clear limitations of the

s

Id.~Insurance-Persons

Insured.-Under a motor vehicle liapolicy issued to a trucking company
that the
"insured" includes the named insured and also "any

[
of motor vehiele finaneial responsibility aet, note,
3G A.L.R.2d J 011 .

C.2d
director or
the scope of his duties
includes an employe
had the company's truck under
it and was acting
;yw"ctcwu for leave to proadditional evidence in a
court will be denied
where no useful purpose would be served in
such
evidence.
!d.-Reversal With Directions.-Where there are no factual
issues to be determined after a reversal of a judgment, and
where the errors of the trial court were of law only, it is
to reverse with directions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Jesse J. Frampton, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment fixing liabilities
of insurers, reversed with directions; application to produce
additional evidence, denied.
Jennings & Belcher, Sigurd E. Murphy and Louis E.
Kearney for Appellant.
Robert W. Stevenson, ,John F. O'Hara, Martin, Hahn &
Camusi, "William P. Camusi and Oscar F. Catalano for Respondents and Interveners.
Bledsoe, Smith, Cathcart, Johnson & Phelps, Early, Maslach, Foran & Williams as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
SCHAUEH, J.-In this suit for declaratory relief determination is sought, as among the contesting insurance companies, of the order of incidence and of the limits of their
contractual obligations to defendants Phoenix Construction Company, Oilfields Trucking Company (hereinafter
called, respectively, Phoenix and Oilfields), and James E.
Mason, all as affected by certain judgments previously recovered by defendant Leming in an action for personal injuries.
Leming was injured in a highway truck collision on July 10,
] 951, caused by the negligent driving by Oilfields' employe,
Mason, of a truck owned by Oilfields. In April, 1955, this
court affirmed a judgment (in Kern County Superior Court
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construction equipment.
into the higlrway contract
ment between themselves that
'"''~u'·'-'-" joint ventures. The
Continental Casualty
, which had issued an insurance

Transport Indemnity Company
, the insurer of Oilfields,
(
and (6) various other persons as to whom the
was dismissed before trial. Complaints in intervention
on behalf on "Underwriters at Ijloyd 'R, London, an
association" (hereinafter callr'd Ijloyd 's IJonrloll ·:. and on behalf of ''Certain Undenuiters at
's
Lloyd's IJOULoJl(lon" (hereinafter ca1lec1 Pacific Lloyd
issued a crrtificate of excess ins1Jrance over the basic
issued by rrransport 1 to Oilfields, and Pacific
ha(1 issued certificates of excess insurance over the basic
Continental to Phoenix.
extensive oral argument the trial <~unrt concluded
v•u"'"'""· Phoenix and Mason are eovere(1 nnder the
and Pacific Hoyd 's policies;
Oilfields. but not
Phoenix or Mason, is covered under the 'l'ransport and Lloyd's
London policies;
that the liability should br
insurers according to a formnla set out in the
the appellant herein, contends that its basic
no coyerage for the liability here
Phoenix, to Oilfiek1s or to
both
endorsements and exclnsions attached
had also issued a policy (R o. 46-00~) of excess insurance
pmvided by the Lloyd's London excess certifieatc.

128
that the
tached to
based solely on
as
and not as an
trial court in the present suit found, among other
Mason was a
employe of Oilfields and a
and that at the time and
he >vas ''acting in the scope and course
as such employee and
' ; Continental quesof the evidence to support the finding
insofar as it refers to Phoenix. Transport (with
's
,
admitting coverage of Oil:fields for any
chargeable to it which arises from the
denies that any coverage was extended by Transport to
Phoenix or to Mason. Transport, Oilfields, Phoenix and
I1eming all contend that the Continental policy (and Pacific
Lloyd's excess certificates) extended coverage to Phoenix, Oilfields and Mason.
For reasons which are hereinafter developed we have
reached the following conclusions:
1. Insofar as the issues now before us are concerned, Mason,
as the negligent driver, bears the primary liability to I1eming.
2. The Transport policy, together with its related excess
insurance, provides $1,000,000 coverage to Mason as well
as to Oilfields, an amount more than sufficient to pay the
Leming award.
3. The Continental policy, together with its related excess
certificates, covers neither Mason nor Oilfields.
4. Hence, there is no need to decide either
whether
the evidence supports the trial court's determination that
Mason was acting as an employe of Phoenix at the time of
the accident, or (b) whether either the Continental or the
rrransport policy (and excess insurance) covers Phoenix.
5. Result : Transport and Lloyd's London must pay the
entire award to I1eming.
[1] ·where a judgment has been rendered against an employer for damages occasioned by the unauthorized negligent
act of his employe, the employer may recoup his loss in an
action against the negligent employe (Pope,ioy v. Hannon
(1951), i37 Cal.2d 159, 173 [19] [231 P.2d 484]; Bradley v.
Rosenthal
), 154 Cal. 420, 423 [97 P.
129 Am.St.
; Johnston· v. City
San ·Pernanclo
), 35 Cal.
2
The liability of Pacific Lloyd's as excess insurer is, of course, depend·
ent on Continental's liability under the basic policy issued to Phoonix.

cite Consolidated
(1941), 45
293 [114
A.1:r
lJJfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. AssuJ·.
, 91 Cal.App.2d 129, 132 [204 P.2d 647] ; EmLiab. Assur. Corp. v. Pacific Ernp. Ins. Co.
,
188, 192 [227 P.2d 53] ; and Tmders etc. Ins.
Emp. Ins. Co. (1955), 130 Cal.App.2d 158,
P.2d 493], as supporting a contrary view; such
broadly distinguishable on their facts but it would
extend this opinion and serve no useful purpose to
discuss and differentiate them as any implications
contrary to the long established rule above stated
deemed disapproved.
Under equitable principles of subrogation the insurer
employer who has been compelled to pay the judgment
the employer may recover against the negligent emthe employe's insurer. (Canadian Indem. Co. v.
States F.&; 0. Co. (1954, 9 Cir.), 213 li'.2d
659;
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Employer·s Mtd. Liab. Ins. Co.
, 208 F.2d 7ill; United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins.
9 Cir.), 172 F.2d 836,840 (note 5), 84G-848.) Here,
established that the negligent act upon which the J_,eming
is based was the unauthorized act of Mason who,
be remembered, is not only a judgment debtor to
but is also a defaulted defendant in this proceeding.
that if Mason was covered with sufiicient insurance
the total r,eming judgment, then the insurance coverOilfie1ds and Phoenix becomes immaterial insofar as
concerns the issues now involved. Consideration will therefore
be given to whether and to what extent Mason
1s covered by the two lines of policies, Continental and
Copies of the insurance policies and excess certificates
which were in effect at the time of the Leming aecident were
into evidence by stipulations, not subject to eon-
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evidence was offered in aid
construction of the
is a
matter of law. (Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones (1946),
27 CaL2d
826-827
P.2d 719, 164 A.L.R. 685] ; see
also Arenson v. National Atdomobile &; Cas. Ins. Co. (1955),
P.2d
.)
81
'' commences with
"Item 1. Name of insured PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION
INc.",
and in
I of the printed ''insuring agreements''
identifies the
protection as Coverages A. B, and C. 4
thus included in the printed policy form, extends
coverage to Phoenix for bodily injury liability. An endorsement, numbered R6309202 and hereinafter referred to as
No. 202, reads as follows: "It is agreed Oil Fields Truckis added as an additional insured in connection
with construction operations conducted as a joint venture with
the Phoenix Constrcution Company, Inc.
"It is further agreed that this policy excludes coverage
for all operations of Oil Fields Trucking Company other than
construction operations conducted as a joint venture with
Phoenix Constrcution Company, Inc."
A second endorsement, numbered R6309208 and hereinafter
referred to as No. 208, reads: "It is agreed that this policy
to automobiles owned, maintained or used
does not
by the Oil Fields Trucking Company, even though, they might
be used in a joint venture operation with other named insureds. ' (Italics added.)
[ 4a, 5] Although if there is any ambiguity in an insurance policy it must be resolved against the insurer (Arenson v.
"'rhe policy defines ''automobile'' as ''a land motor vehicle.''
'Such coverages read as follows: "Coverage A-Bodily Injury Liability
''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom,
sustained by any person.
''Coverage B-Property Damage I1iability-Automobile
''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or
destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any
automobile.
''Coverage C-Property Damage Liability-Except Automobile
"To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or
destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by
accident.''
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agreements are part of the
the clear import of the t\YO endorsements liS
202) Oilfields is added as a second named
as to construction operations ccmducte<1
with Phoenix, and (No. 208) that the
provides no coverage for)
to
the operation of automobiles
maintained or used
even though "used in a joint venture
oi her named insureds." It follows that the Continental
(and excess certificates ancillary tb ereio) provided no
to Mason for the accident to Leming, which resulted
Mason's negligent operation of a truck owned
OilThe suggestion of various of the
on appeal
llul' errtain of the other printed policy
may be
1651: '''Where a eon tract is pm'tly written
or where part of it is written or printed undpr
of tho parties, and with a special view to their Hllcw,,w,,r,
tl1c remainder iH eopicd from a form originally
reference to the particnl:u parties and the
the written parts control the printed
al'e
original control thoRe whieh nrc
a form. And if
tlw two are absolutely repugnant, the latter muRt be so far disTcgarded.''
'Snell provisions, found in paragraph III of the
insuring agreeread as follows so far as here material:
'The unqualified word
includes the named insured and also includes . . .
A and B, any person while using . . .
hired
the actual use of tho automobile is by the namerl insnred
permission . . . I except that the 1 insurance with respect to
. . . other than the named insured docs not
(d)
to any hired automobile, to the owner
or any
of such owner . . . . ''
be noted that even if
were snecc,sful in their
that "hired automobile"
the Oiliie!llH' truck hon;
involved, nevertheless it appears that exception (d) would deny coYerage
to
the admitted employe of Oilfields.
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to include Mason as an insured must likewise
of the endorsement
of vehicles owned
coverage of the policy. [8] An insurance company has the
to limit the coverage of a policy issued
it and when
it has done so, the plain language of the limitation must be
Coit v.
Stand.anl
Ins. Co.
28 CaL2d 1, 11;
v. lV est Coast
, 16 CaL2d
23-24 [104 P.2d
Indem. Co. (1937), 8 CaL2d 476, 478-480
J09 A.L.R 1162] Security T. & 8. Bank v. New
Indern.. Co. (1934), 220 Cal. 372, 376-377 [31 P.2d
;
,John G.
a; Co. V. Underwriters at
London
(1948), 84 CaLApp.2d 603, 605 [191 P.2d 124]; Guidici v.
Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. (1947), 79 CaLApp.2d 128, 134 [179
P.2d 337]; Boole v. Un·ion lY!aTine Ins. Co., Ltd. (1921), 52
Cal.App. 207, 209 [198 P. 416] ; American Mut. Liabilz:ty Ins.
Co. v. Meyer (1940, 3 Cir.), 115 F.2d 807.)
The next question is whether Mason had insurance coverage under the Transport line of policies. It is undisputed
that at the time of the Leming accident Mason was an employe
of Oilfields, that the Leming judgment was based upon an
implied jury finding that in driving Oilfields' truck Mason
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time
of the accident, and that the trial court in the present litigation likewise found that he was acting within such scope.
It is also undisputed that at the time of the accident Mason
was exercising sole control and direction of the truck.
It now becomes essential to consider certain provisions
of the basic Transport policy. Under Coverage Clause (1)
Transport agrees ''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay for
damages, arising out of the occupation of the named insured,
as a result of bodily injury ... or death to persons or for
damage to property of others . . . '' Various endorsements
attached to the policy state that it "is an Automobile Bodily
Injury Liability and Property Damage Liability policy" and
declare that the ''Occupation of the named insured is MoTOR
CARRIER FOR HmK '' Another endorsement provides that the
"Narne of the Insured . . . is amended to read : Oilfields
Trucking Company and P. A. Phoenix and II. E. Phoenix,
as eo-partners only, jointly and not RevrraHy, doing business
as Phoenix Brothers Garage and Storage Company [and]
It is further agreed that the named insured is: CoRPORATION-

) DEFLN!'l'IOXS

insnrPr1' :-Jmll mean the
(
L'Jc;1mED The
\vord 'immred'
JHlmerl insured nnr1 also inc1ncleiS
1 : 1) any
, executive oniec:r, nwnd i n•et or or stoekhoh1er t1wreof

trail,•r or semi-trailer and its
HE,;r•oxsmrLTTY [,A ws Such insuranee as is afforded
shall r:ompl,v with the
of the motor
flnanrial rP;.;ponsibility law of any state or province
shall he applic:ablc, u·ith
to any such l'iability
ont of tlJe
ownership, maintenance or use
automobile r1nring th<~ policy period, to the extent of
;!;,• ,·uyernge and limits of liability required by such law."
added.)
fnrther to be noted (and the significance will later
that the basic policy prominently disarlvlec seemingly applicable to the person directly in
of, operating, or" managing" the motor vehicle. Under
"\VnA•r 'l'o Do TN CAsE OF AccmENT" it ad" Stop, reiH1er ai.d. Place flags, flares, or post
warn other traffic·-··aYoid other accidents. Get
and addresses of witnesses. If no eye witnesses, obtain
and addresses of first persons to arrive. Get 1icense
numbers of vehicles if persons refuse names. Heport acciin\·olving injury (no matter how slight) immediately
telrphone to our nearest claim office. Order photographs in
I serious aceidents; the Exchange will asr<nme the cost.
Be
eom·teons-GooD CoNDUCT lh:r"Ps. Draw rough diagram of
s<o"lh~ of aceident showing position of vehicles or Rkidmarks;
olf distances. 'l'his will assist in giving an aecuratc
Protect your equipment or cargo from further damtheft." Under the heading "\VnAT NoT 'l'o Do IN
OF' AcciDEK'r" it cautions:
"Do not admit n•sponsi; let the J~xehangc determine if you are legally rcsponDo HOt agree to pay anything, except for immediate
Aid treatment. In accidents iuvolving death, do not talk
st atenwnt;; mttil yo11 arP represcnte(l by an at! orney
lmw this rigl1t unrllor the law. Don't arg1te n•sponsicur~

~

L
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bility for the accident. Don't make any verbal statements
at the scene of accident regarding the accident. Statements
you make may be used as evidence against you. Do NoT SIGN
ANYTHING, except for your insurance
Be sure
to identify the insurance investigator as representing yo~tr
company, not someone else." (Italics added.)
At the times concerned Oilfields, by reason of its
was
to the Highway Carriers Act
223) and was required §
''to procure, and continue in
effect during the life of the permit [issued by the Public
Utilities Commission and without which Oilfields' operations
would be unlawful], adequate protection . . . against liability imposed by law . . . for the payment of damages for
personal bodily injuries . . . " Section 6 of the Highway
Carriers Act further enacts that ''The protection required
under section 5 shall be evidenced by the deposit with the
Railroad [now Public Utilities] Commission, covering each
vehicle used or to be used under the permit applied for, of
a policy of public liability and property damage insurance
. . . or of a bond of a surety company . . . or of a personal
bond . . . "
At the times concerned Oilfields was also subject to California's general automobile financial responsibility law. That
law is found in sections 410 through 423.1 of the Vehicle Code.
(See Escobedo v. State (1950), 35 Cal.2d 870, 878 [222 P.2d
1] .) Sections 410-418.5, which comprise chapter 2, cover
the matter of establishing responsibility after an accident and
an unpaid judgment, while sections 419-423.1, which comprise
chapter 3, provide for such a showing after the accident and
before any judgment, all directly intended for the benefit of
dr·ivers and owners of motor vehicles as a means of forestalling
suspension of the license of the driver and of the registration
of the vehicle or vehicles, and, more fundamentally, designed
to give monetary protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons who while lawfully using the
highways themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent use of those highways by others. [9] Such a law is
remedial in nature and in the public interest is to be liberally
construed to the end of fostering its objectives. (See Wheeler
v. O'Connell (1937), 297 Mass. 549 [9 N.E.2d 544, 111 A.L.R.
1038, 1041] .) As said by Mr. Justice Heydenfeldt for this
court long ago, and still the law, "The rule of law in the
construction of remedial statutes requires great liberality,
and wherever the meaning is doubtful, it must be so construed

CAs. Co. v. PHOENIX CoNSTR. Co. 435
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(While v.
Ann
. 462. 470 [65 ~1\.m.Dec.
see also Cullerton v.
), 22 CaL 96, 98; Cormcmis v. Gcnella (1863), 22
]25; Davis v. Hearst (1911), 160 Cal. 143, 188 [116

2, the
with his
Mason)
whose truck was operated
of the registration of the vehicle (V ch.
subd.
; Sheehan v. Division
Motor Vehicles
, 140 Cal.App. 200, 205
P.2d 359]) unless he files
affidavit
that at the time of the accident . . . he
that the insurer is liable to pay such judgment,
reason, if known, 1vhy such insurance company has
sneh judgment. He shall also file the original
of insurance or a certified copy thereof, if available,''
his sho·wing is satisfactory his registration certificate
uot be su:spended. (Veh. Code, § 411.5.) Under section
the procedure is made applicable to successive accidents
jucigments.
Seetion 415 is entitled "Requisites of Motor V chicle LiaPolicy," and provides: "(a) A 'motor vehicle liability
, ' as used in th·is code means a policy of liability insur. . . to or for the benefit of the person named therein as
which policy shall meet the following requirements:
" 1) Such policy shall designate by explicit description or
reference all motor vehicles with respect to
coverage is thereby intended to be granted.
Such policy shall insure the person named therein
any other person [here, l\Iason] using or responsible for
of said motor vehicle or rnotor vehicles w·ith the
1 xpress or implied permission of said assured.
'' ) Such policy shall insure every said person on account
the . . . operation of every motor vehicle therein covered
. . against loss from the liability imposed by law arising
such . . . operation to the extent . . . with respect
each such motor vehicle, of five thousand dollars ( $5,000)
bodily injury to or death of each person as a result of
one accident and, subject to said limit as to one person,
amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for bodily into or death of all persons as a result of any one accident . . .

PHoENIX CoNSTR. Co.

in
or contain any
or
conflict with the
of this code
to law. .
" (Italics added.)
[10]
although the financial
of
does not in so many words make mandatory the
a liability insurance policy prior to the first accident and
the Highway Carriers Act does.
an
employer who is a highway
as a practical matter in
the ordinary course of business, in order to protect against
the possibility of suspension in case of a judgment against
himself and his employe, must have in force a policy complying
with the requisites of section 415. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1963, subds. 4, 20.) Here, of course, it is not disputed that
the Transport liability insurance policy was executed; the
only dispute with which we are seriously concerned is whether
and to what extent the policy covered Mason in his operation
of Oilfields' truck at the time of the Leming accident.
It is the position of Transport (among other contentions)
that California's financial responsibility laws do not require
that Mason's liability be covered, that section 415 of the
Vehicle Code has no application to the present ease, and that
in order to avoid the forfeiture or suspension provisions of
the law by evidence of insurance it is not necessary for the
owner of a motor vehicle to show that the personal liability
of his employe is insured. \Ve have given careful consideration to all of Transport's arguments. 7 It is, however, our
conclusion reached in the light of all pertinent provisions of
7
We note in this connection that under the provisions of chapter 3
(Veh. Code, ~§ 419-423.1), as they existed on the date of the accident
here involved (July 10, 1951), it is made the duty of the driver, and in
case the driver was permissively operating ''a motor vehicle owned,
operated or leased by" his employer then it is the duty of the employer
rather than of the driver ( § 419), to report to the department of motor
vehicles any accident which resulted in personal injury or death; except
that the employer need not make such a I"eport if the vehicle involved
in the accident ''is owned or operated by any person or corporation who
has filed with the department a certificate of an insurance carrier or
bonding company that there is in effect a policy or bond meeting the
requirements of Section 422.6 and when such insurance policy or bond
was in full force and effect in respect to .such vehicle at the time of the
accident.'' Unless a driver can meet the pre-accident security provisions
laid down in chapter 3, he is required to deposit security or suffer
suspension of driving privileges in this state, except that if he was per·
missively driving his employer's motor vehicle then the suspension provisions do not apply to the driver but instead do apply to the employer;
unless the employer can meet the pre-accident security provisions
(i.e., insurance policy, or bond) in such case, he is required to deposit
security or suffer the suspension of ''registration of all vehicles not
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, that
coverage
Oilfields' truck and that
as to
in immranee law that any
an msnranee
is to be resolved
rcnson Y. National A11io. &; Cas. Ins. Co.
45 Ca1.2d
fl:=l; Coit v.
Standard
(194tl), swpm, 28 Cal.2d 1, 3; 5 Am.,Tnr. 790,
Tf smnantieally permissible, the eontract will
sneh (·onstrtieiion as will fairly achieve its object
to the insured for the losses to which
ranee relates. (Fageol1'. & C. Co. v. Pac1:jie Indem.
) , 18 CaL2d 748, 751 1117 P.2d
.) [12] If
uses language which is uncertain any reasonable
will be rrso1 ved against it if the doubt relates to
r.r faet of eovcragc, whether as to pi•ri1 insured against
T. & C. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co. (1941), 18 Cal.2d
746-747 116, 171 r117 P.2cl6611; Ocran etc. Corp., Ltd. v.
/)l(luslrial Lice. Cmn. (1924), 194 Cal. 127, 132 r228 P. 1];
Y. United Ins. Co. (1952), 113 Cal.App.2d 493 [248
H8]; Pendell v. Westland Life Ins. Co. (1950), 95 Cal.
766, 770 [214 P.2d 392] ; see also Christoffer v. IIartA. cc. etc. Co. (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d Supp. 979 [267
) , the amount of liability (Hobson v. Mutual Benefit
A. Assn. ( 1930), 99 Cal.App.2d 330, 333 et seq. [221
; see also N arve1· v. Caliform:a State Life Ins. Co.
, 211 CaL 176, 180 et seq. [294 P. 3931) or the person
persons protected (Olson v. Standard Marine Ins. Co.
i, lOD Ca1.App.2d 130, 135 [1, 5] [240 P.2d 379]; see
insurance . . . owned, OJWratprl or l0nsed l,y him . . . ''
declares that exemption from the requirements of post·
sccnrity following an nccident may be esta hlishod by satisfactory
to the department (a) that tho owner had ''in effect with resped
tho driYcr or the motor n•hicle inYolved in the accident . . • an autoor bond . . . [which] shall meet the requirements
that the driver, if not the ow11er, had in effect
his own driving; " (c) That such liability
arise from tho
operation of the motor vehiele involved
neeidont
in the ;judgmrmt of the depnrtment covered by some
of: liability insuran<~l' or homl whid1 eomplies with the rcqnirrforth under Seetion .J:22.G.''
4~:l.H sets forth enrtnin qualifieations of the insnranee comtmd Tequirm policy limits of not less than ;iffl,OOO for injury or
of one person in any one areid('nt, $10,000 for two or more
persons in the same accident, and .$1,000 property damage.
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also Island v. Fireman's lhtnd Indem. Co. (
' 30
541,
548 [184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R 896] ;
v. American Indern. Co. (1932), 127 Cal.App. 202 [15 P.2d
), the
language ·will be understood in its most inclusive
for
the benefit of the insured. [13a] Here we have the
explicit provision of section 415 of the V ehiclc Code that ''A
'motor vehicle liability policy,' as used in this code means a
policy . . . , which policy shall meet the
ments: .. (2) Such poliey shall insure the person named
therein and any other person using or responsible for the
use of said motor vehiele . . . with the . . .
of
said assured," and coupled with that are the provisions of the
Highway Carriers Act and the language of the policy, some
of it as already emphasized being apparently directed primarily to the driver of the vehicle, admonishing him as to his
duties upon the happening of an aceident, and in another
plaee declaring that the coverage provided ''shall comply with
the provisions of the motor vehicle financial responsibility
law . . . which shall be applicable with respect to any sttch
liability arising out of the existence . . . or use of any automobile . . . to the extent of the eoverage and limits of liability required by such law." (Italics added.) That language
cannot properly be construed to mean minimum coverage or
minimum limits; rather, it must be interpreted as providing
full or maximum coverage in both aspeets insofar as encompassed by the law and not exceeding the clear limitations of
the contraet.
[14] We have hereinabove noted the contract provision
expressly stating that "The unqualified word 'insured' ineludes the named insured and also as respeets Coverage
Clause 1 [the coverage clause here involved] . . . any partner, executive officer, managing employee, director or stoekholdcr thereof while acting within the seope of his duties
as sueh . . . " Obviously the term "managing employee"
is used for generic inelusion. 55 Corpus ,Juris Secundum, page
2, tells us that "managing" means "To have under control
and c1ireetion; to eontrol and direct; . . . to guide.'' Webster's New International Dictionary gives the same meanings.
\Ve need not g·o farther. It is undisputed that Mason at the
time of the r_,eming accident was Oilfields' employe and that
he had Oilfields' truck under his control and direction; he
was guiding it and he was acting within the scope of his
duties. In respect to the several tons of equipment entrusted
to him he was Oilfields' sole managing employe. The very
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signification. 'l'his argument, however, for reain the authorities already cited, must be resolved
the insurer and in favor of coverage. We must thereas already indicated, that the Transport policy
Mason in his operation, direction and control of the
truck here involved.
·with respect to the extent or limits of coverage of
it has already been noted that condition ( 6) of the
'l'ransport policy states, ''to the extent of the . . . limits
required by such law" and that such language
its full and inclusive, as opposed to a restrictive,
The primary Transport policy, Number 46-001, is
limited to $5,000 for injury or death of one person and
for two or more persons injured or killed in any one
accident. Lloyd's London excess certificate 46-C3-32 provides
insurance in the amount of $40,000 excess over $10,000
the hazards and perils of Comprehensive Bodily
Property Damage and Cargo Liability Coverage as
under policies issued by the Transport Indemnity
. . . to Oilfields Trucking Company, et al. and
persons . . . named as insureds under said policies,
hereinafter called the Assured.'' The certificate further
declares that "It is the intention of the parties that under
the Assured is to be indemnified up to $40,000.00
aforesaid, against all liability in excess of the liability
Primary Insurer under its policies.
of
It is agreed that this Policy is subject to the same WarTerms and Conditions (except as regards . . . the
and limit of Liability . . . ) as are contained in, or
may be added to said Policy of the Primary Insurer.''
Inasmuch as Mason was covered by the primary Transport
(No. 46-001, with limits of $5,000 and $10,000), the
's London certificate ( 46-C3-32) thus increases his coverthe amount of $40,000.
Transport policy 46-002 furnishes additional excess coverage "over $50,000.00" in an amount of $950,000. The "spe-
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to the same
terms and con.
ditions
the amount and limit of lia~
bility .
as are contained
or as may be added to the
primary policy issued by . . 'rransport . . . " Thus, Mason's coverage was increased
this policy to an aggregate
total of one million dollars, obviously sufficient to meet the
I1eming judgment of less than a
of a million.
Inasmuch as the Transport line of policies did, and the
Continental line did not, afford personal coverage to Mason,
the driver upon whom ultimate responsibility for the Leming
judgment otherwisl:) devolves, it follows that no further controversy remains to be decided as between the other parties
to this litigation. It may further be noted that placing the
responsibility for the insurance coverage squarely upon the
carriers for Mason and for his employer, the owner of the
truck he was driving, not only accords with the purposes and
intents of the policy provisions and of the financial re~
sponsibility law, but appears also to accomplish justice as
among all the parties involved in this declaratory suit.
[15] One final matter remains for mention. Plaintiffappellant, Continental, has filed in this court an application
for leave to produce additional evidence (see rule 23, subd.
(b), Rules on .Appeal) which it avers will show that full payment of the Leming judgment has been made by or on behalf
of Phoenix, Oilfields, and Transport; that full satisfaction of
such judgment has been entered of record; and that by reason
of such facts and upon various asserted legal principles any
theory for contribution by Continental has become unenforceable. In view of our conclusions as stated hereinabove, no
useful purpose would be served in receiving such evidence,
and the application to produce the same will be denied.
[16] Because there will be no factual issues to be determined after a reversal of the judgment, since the errors of the
trial court were of law only, it is appropriate to reverse with
directions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53; Estate of Davis ( 1936),
8 Cal.2d 11, 12 [62 P.2d 582, 63 P.2d 827]; Wixom v. Davis
(1926), 198 Cal. 641, 645 [246 P. 1041]; Stauter v. Carithers
(1921), 185 Cal. 160, 164 [196 P. 37].) 8
8
The fact that the Pacific Lloyd's group (providers of the excess
certificates over the basic Continental policy issued to Phoenix) did not
appeal does not preclude reversal as to them, for the phase of the
judgment relating to their alleged liability is so inextricably interwoven
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agree
msuranr·.e \:overed Mason and
but do not agree that the Continent nl jn;;;urnm·P
not cover Oilfields and Mason. The
hold;;; that Mason and Oilficlds are not eoverer1 by Continental
of an endorsement on the Continental
>Yhieh
it says excludes the operation of automobiles.
Oilfields and Phoenix ·were engaged in a joint vcntnn:.
cu,cuc.:u issued a policy to Phoenix as the named insnrer1.
policy was mainly concerned 1vith coyer age of liability
out of the operation of automobiles. At the time the
was issued the endorsements here involved ;,vcre at·
taehed. Both endorsements 202 and 208 were a(lded at the
time, one following the other in attachment to thr polic•.;·
and both were typewritten. They read (202): "It i,; agreed
Oil Pields Trucking Company is mlded as an ad(litional in.
in connection with construction operations eondncted
as joint venture with the Phoenix Constrnction Compnny,
Tnc.
"It is further agreed that this policy excludes rovcrag·r
a1l operations of Oil Pields Trucking Company other than
construction operations conducted as a joint venture with
Phoenix Construction Com pan:."." And 208 rea(l: "lt is
that this policy does not apply to automobiles owned,
maintained or used by the Oil Fields Trneking Company,
even though, they might be used in a joint venture operation
othrr namrd insnrerls. '' Thesr en(1orsrnwnts mnst be
together for they deal ·with thr same
Tnasmm::h
arc both t.ypewriitcn the~· an• on an rq11al footing
Ollf' 1lo''" not eontrol ov1.~r tlw other.
HrlW<' tlw rnle, illai
th:tt. ;1 ('Ompi('t~· reYt't':-i;d is llt'('f'S~:1
H!af'llf'! Y. maehe (1 n:;n'
C:tl.:2<1
1.

.ilJdg·nleHi.
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upon

makes Oilfields a named insured
with Phoenix insofar as the two are
joint venture. Hence Oilfields is as
covered as
that
to the same extent as if it had been named
Phoenix in the
, the main purpose of
was to
Then comes endorsement 208.
cover automobile
It is
to
that endorsement to exclude operation of trucks owned
Oilfields and used in the
venture as is done
the
may be interpreted to be in direct conflict with 202 on the basis that
202 extends coverage to Oilfields as an insured and then 208
purports to take that coverage away. So
the rule
of construction against the insurer would
that 208
be ignored.
There is another wholly reasonable construction which
limits 208 to joint ventures between Oilfields and Phoenix and
others who might be insureds. It will be recalled that in
making Oilfields an insured, 202 expressly mentions and
makes it such an insured in joint venture construction operations between Oilfields and Phoenix by that name. Endorsement 208 then says that, as to automobile operations by Oilfields, the policy does not extend even though they might be
used in a joint venture with other insureds. It is reasonable
to interpret "even though" as "if" (May v. J1issour·i Pac.
R. Co., 143 Ark. 75 [219 S.W. 756,
; Webster's New
Inter. Diet. (2d ed.), pp. 885, 77) and "other" insured as
"different from that which has been specified" (Robinson
v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., (La.App.) 10 So.2d 249, 251;
In re Nelson's Estate, 152 Misc. 245 [273 N.Y.Supp. 268];
'Webster's New Inter. Diet. (2d ec1.), p. 1729). Endorsement
208 then reads that the policy does not cover automobiles
owned by Oilfields if they are used in joint venture operations with different insureds. We already have a joint venture expressly named in 202. A different one then would
be a venture between Oilfields and some insured other than
Phoenix. Hence where, as here, the liability arose out of
the Phoenix-Oilfields joint venture and none
208 is not
applicable.
Oilfielcls being a named insured, then Mason, its employee,
the driver of the truck is clearly covered because the policy
states that the insured includes "any person while using an
owned automobile'' if the use is by the insured ''or with

95
pur-

most
. NMth American Ace. Ins.
P.
26 khR. 1231; Bayley v. Em125 Cal. 345, 352
P. 7].) The inbound to use such language as to make the exceptions
of the contract clear to the ordinary mind;
fails to do so, any uncertainty or reasonable
resolYed against it. (Pacific etc. Co. v. Wil158 Cal. 367, 370 [111 P. 41.)" (Emphasis
)

accordance with that rule, endorsement 208, being susthe construction that it does not take away the

of the judg-ment recovered by Leming against
Oilfields and Phoenix within the limits of their re-

of respondents Oilfields 'rrucking Co., Transand Underwriters at I,loyd 's I1ondon
·was dtmied May 29, 1~);')6. Shenk, J., and
were of the opinion that the petition should be

